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Abstract
Rationalist models of judicial decision-making expect courts to defend their institutional
integrity in politically sensitive cases. This article presents two African case studies of
courts not doing so. They have elicited predictable backlash from executives and placed
their  institutions  in  avoidable  danger.  I  argue  that  judges’ desire  for  esteem  from
emerging global judicial networks can explain this otherwise puzzling behaviour. These
new  networks  become  particularly  salient  in  human  rights  cases.  This  conclusion
partially supports Anne-Marie Slaughter’s controversial claims about the significance of
‘the global community of law’ but also identifies risks this poses for courts’ domestic
authority. The argument is made with reference to two recent and well-known decisions
by  the  High  Court  of  Botswana  and  Southern  African  Development  Community
Tribunal. The first case,  Sesana  (2006), dealt with the vexed question of indigenous
rights in Africa.  The second case,  Campbell  (2008),  concerned the compensation of
expropriated commercial farmers from Zimbabwe.
Key words
Constitutionalism,  judicial  politics,  human  rights,  judicial  networks,  Botswana,
Zimbabwe.
Author biography
Peter Brett is a Lecturer in International Politics at Queen Mary, University of London.
His research interests are in judicial politics, legal sociology and the history of rights in
international relations. He also teaches at the University of London Institute in Paris.
1
Introduction*
Ours is an age of ʽjudicialisationʼ: the spread and empowerment of constitutional and
international courts across the globe. In new democracies, especially, courts have been
remarkably  successful  in  expanding  their  activity  without  provoking  backlash  from
political elites. How judges have been able to do so represents a puzzle for political
scientists. ʽStrategic modelsʼ typically solve it by highlighting judgesʼ political savvy
(see introduction to this special issue). By being attentive to government’s wishes, and
carefully crafting their rulings to minimise confrontation, they have gradually eroded
executive privileges. As one scholar puts it, even the ʽcredible threatʼ of backlash from
the executive produces a ʽchilling effect on judicial decision-making patterns […] who
says Supreme Court judges are not shrewd political animals?ʼ (Hirschl 2008: 98).
 In this study, by contrast, I show how some courts have paid more attention to
signals from global judicial networks, than to those emanating from the executive. They
have also paid a price for doing so: political backlash undermining their institutional
integrity. Some other scholars, it is true, have also challenged orthodox beliefs about
new courts’ prudential  deference  (Helmke  and  Staton,  2011:  306,  325-6).  But  they
continue to assume that courts always defend their institutional interests, using rational
choice assumptions to generate a more complex set of trade-offs confronting judges.
Constitutional  adjudication,  they  argue,  is  a  repeated  game.  Deferential  strategies
ultimately provide litigants with incorrect information about the court’s real preferences.
This, over the long-term, lowers the courtʼs use, undermining the institution. Risking
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backlash may therefore, on occasion at least, be a rational choice (Helmke and Staton,
2011:  317-8).  In  what  follows  I  question  these  widely-held  assumptions  about
institutional interests. In neither of my case studies did judges act as ʽshrewd political
animalsʼ. Courts effectively chose to put themselves in danger by signalling to their
global networks. Strategic trade-offs cannot explain the risks they took.
I make this argument using two highly controversial  southern African human
rights cases. Sesana (2006) was an indigenous rights case at the Botswanan High Court,
whilst  Campbell  2008 saw expropriated Zimbabwean farmers seek redress from the
Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC)  Tribunal1.  (The  latter  poses  a
particular challenge for repeated game theorists: subsequent backlash saw the tribunal
stripped of individual access rights after its first case of any significance.) Both cases, I
suggest,  constitute  qualified  evidence  for  the  importance  of  something  whose
significance  political  scientists  generally  downplay: Anne-Marie  Slaughter’s  (2003:
211) ʽglobal community of lawʼ (cf.  Black and Epstein, 2007). This ʽcommunityʼ is a
classic case of an informal between-bench network (see special issue introduction). It is
comprised  of  judges  who conceive of  themselves  as  ʽautonomous actors  forging an
autonomous relationship with their  foreign or supranational counterpartsʼ (Slaughter,
1994:  123).  ʽMutual  recognition  as  participants  in  a  common enterpriseʼ,  Slaughter
argues, characterises relations between constitutional courts in a ʽwidening community
of liberal statesʼ, including new democracies (Slaughter, 1994: 131-2). This  network
straddles  issue  areas,  legal  traditions,  levels  of  jurisdiction,  and  older  transnational
forms of inter-judicial recognition (such as those within the Commonwealth). Judges
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use it to exchange information and build a ‘global legal systemʼ (Slaughter, 2004: 100,
243). This horizontal ʽdialogueʼ is both face-to-face  (at a growing number of global
inter-judicial conferences) and at a distance (via the increasingly common practice of
courts citing foreign decisions) (e.g. Slaughter, 2003: 192; 2004: 51, 65).
Recent  judicial  politics  scholarship  has  treated  appeals  to  global  judicial
networks as ʽinstrumentalʼ attempts to boost credibility and thus ʽensure complianceʼ or
ʽsecure material resourcesʼ (e.g. Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2015: 3, 171-2). The ‘global
community of law’ is, however, (dangerously) irreducible to such instrumental calculus.
Its emergence need not therefore advance the institutional interests of courts in new
democracies (contrast Ginsburg and Garoupa, 2015: 168). Judges, as Baum (2006: 25)
argues, ‘are people’. Like us they want to be ‘liked and respected by others who are
important  to  them’.  Loyalties  and  affinities,  even  transnational  ones,  are  thus  not
necessarily subservient to domestic strategic imperatives. And this holds wherever ties
are situated on the continuum from the material  to  the ideational  (see special  issue
introduction).  Flanagan  and  Ahern’s  (2011,  34) survey  of  common  law  judges  in
constitutional  rights  cases  found that  the ‘aspiration to  membership  of  an emerging
international ‘guild’’ was a more important motivation for citing foreign law than the
participation in a common jurisprudential enterprise hypothesised by Slaughter. My case
studies  support  this  conclusion.  They also  highlight  the  potential  for  unmanageable
tensions between the cultivation of reputation in global judicial networks and the steady
acquisition  of  domestic  political  authority,  particularly  where  regimesʼ  basic
legitimations prove incompatible  global human rights scripts.  The next two sections
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justify my method and case selection, and are followed by analyses of first  Campbell
and then Sesana.
Method
This is a plausibility probe. Its overriding objective is to establish that judges
can act against their institutional interests.  Some judges have certainly behaved  as if
non-instrumental  appeals  to  global  networks  have  trumped  the  ʽchilling  effectsʼ  of
executive signalling. They do not so as a rule. This methodological caution partially
reflects  ʽthe  inherent  limits  in  our  understanding  of  the  forces  that  shape  judicial
behaviour such as judicial decisionsʼ, and the corresponding requirement that claims
about  them  be  ʽexpressed  in  indefinite  termsʼ  (Baum 2006:  173-4).  But  it  is  also
justified by continued scepticism surrounding the relevance of the ʽglobal community of
lawʼ for empirical scholarship. My contribution to this debate seeks to indicate areas
where Slaughter's conclusions still merit further testing. 
Slaughter  has,  notably,  been  justly  criticised  for  lacking  methodological  and
conceptual rigour (cf. Meierhenrich, 2009). She does not specify how her object can be
measured or identified, and neglects social network analysis tools.  Some of her critics
maintain that inter-judicial communication remains largely confined to networks created
during legal  education and training (Law and Chang, 2011: 529-530).  Transnational
ʽdialogueʼ, when it exists, is more often monologue. On Slaughterʼs (2004: 74) view, for
example, the Canadian Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court ʽhave
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both been highly influentialʼ in promoting the citation of foreign decisions. Yet by Law
and Changʼs (2011: 532) reckoning the South African court actually cites its Canadian
counterpart  almost  three  hundred  times  more  often  than  the  inverse.  Others  critics
wonder  if  ʽthe  global  communityʼ  is  not  limited  to  ʽparticular  class[es]  of  recent
decisionsʼ, such as human rights cases (Black and Epstein, 2007: 796-7). Whilst still
others query how Slaughterʼs points could be proved. ʽWhatʼ, for example,  ʽare the
measurable  consequences  of  international  conferencing?ʼ (Meierhenrich,  2009:  87).
Most judges consider such meetings opportunities for ʽsmall  talkʼ (Law and Chang,
2011: 567). And the mere ʽimpressions of a random and unrepresentative sample of
judgesʼ do not suffice to establish general trends (Meierhenrich, 2009: 88). 
It  is true, firstly,  that like Slaughter (1994: 130; 2003: 194-7; 2004: 69-79) I
deploy judgesʼ own words as evidence2. My interpretations, however, are not intended
to ʽproveʼ any rival  theory,  but  merely to indicate  why the cultivation of esteem in
global judicial networks is a particularly plausible alternative to rationalist explanations
(see also Kersch, 2009: 96). Whenever possible I use a now orthodox method among
legal historians to guide these interpretations: prioritising off-bench statements without
immediate  implications  for  ongoing  cases  (see  Sharafi,  2007:  1080-1081).  As  long
highlighted by ʽstrategic modelsʼ of judicial decision-making, judgesʼ political attitudes
and value preferences cannot be straightforwardly inferred from their words or actions
in the courtroom. Imperatives specific to legal institutions must always supervene. My
attempted  reconstructions  of  judgesʼ  understandings  of  their  role  in  international
relations thus supplement analyses of  dicta and opinions with interview material and
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even a novel written by a judge (compare Kersch, 2009). 
I  also  accept,  secondly,  that  human  rights  cases  may  be  unrepresentative.
Slaughter herself (1994: 132) even admits that global networking is ʽparticularly potent
in the human rights fieldʼ  (for supportive survey evidence Flanagan and Ahern 2011,
14). The scope of my argument is therefore limited to this class of decision alone. And I
concede, thirdly, the unevenness of engagement with transnational networks. The South
African Constitutional Court is indeed an unusual institution. It was deliberately created
outside the ordinary courts system in order to insulate it from the automatic promotion
of old-order judges. Its prolific citation of foreign courts,  meanwhile,  was explicitly
encouraged by Section 35(1) of the South African constitution; a provision drafted, in
Slaughter's (2004, 73-4) terms, as a ‘badge of legitimacy’ for the post-apartheid state.
Flanagan and Ahern’s (2011, 15) surveys indicate, similarly, that judges who hold their
foreign counterparts ‘in higher professional esteem than [domestic] subordinates’, are
most likely to cite them. My own Southern African case studies are intended to provide
(dramatic) additional indications of how the ʽglobal community of lawʼ may exercise
particular influence over judges aspiring to membership of an international ʽguildʼ.
A Tale of Two Courts
Two features of my case studies make them particularly suitable for probing the
plausibility of the claim that judges do not systematically prioritise courtsʼ institutional
integrity.  In both cases, firstly,  executive preferences could not have been clearer or
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stronger. Both were examples of what Hirschl (2008) calls ʽthe judicialisation of mega-
politicsʼ; the most striking of all recent expansions of higher court activity. Adjudicating
ʽsuch matters is an inherently and substantively political  exerciseʼ, and may involve
ʽjudicial  scrutiny of  executive-branch  prerogatives  in  the  realms  of  macroeconomic
planning  or  national  security  …  [and]  electoral  processesʼ.  Most  dramatic  of  all,
however, has been ʽthe judicialisation of formative collective identity, nation-building
processes, and struggles over the very definition or raison dʼêtre of the polity as suchʼ:
an ʽinvolvement in the political sphere beyond any previous limitʼ (Hirschl, 2008: 98-
9). (Famous examples include the Israeli Supreme Courtʼs ruling on which Judaism is
referred to by the countryʼs constitutional self-definition as a ʽJewish and democratic
stateʼ,  and  the  Canadian  Supreme  Courtʼs  1995  ruling  that  unilateral  Quebecois
secession would be illegal even following a majority vote.) Courts, in both my cases,
directly  challenged  the  central  legitimation  strategies  of  parties  ruling  since
independence.
In  both  cases,  secondly,  legal  commentators  agree  that  judges  could  have
adjudicated in ways less threatening to the executive. They had room for manoeuvre.
But  executive  signalling,  inevitable  given  the  political  stakes,  failed  to  elicit  the
ʽshrewdʼ  political  behaviour  anticipated  by  assumptions  about  judgesʼ  institutional
interests.  By behaving as  if  they were signalling to  global  judicial  networks,  courts
provoked easily predictable (and widely predicted) forms of backlash – state responses
that VonDoepp and Ellett (2011: 152) characterise as ʽgeneral institutional assault[s]ʼ.
This was most marked in  Campbell (from Zimbabwe), which resulted in fundamental
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institutional restructuring. In Sesana (from Botswana), by contrast, backlash only took
the  form  of  ʽdeliberately  failing  to  abide  by  court  rulings  or  bypassing  judicial
institutionsʼ  -  notwithstanding  speculation  about  the  rulingʼs  effect  on  judicial
appointments (see VonDoepp and Ellett, 2011: 152). 
It should be noted, finally, that I make this argument about both an international
and a domestic court. Traditionally scholars have assumed that international courts are
less constrained politically,  and so we might  already expect  them to be attentive to
ideational  networks.  Empirical  analysis  has  shown,  however,  that  such contrasts  are
‘overstated’  (Ginsburg,  2015:  486).  States  retain  numerous  control  mechanisms.
Younger and weaker international courts, meanwhile - like the SADC Tribunal - have
been shown to be especially sensitive to state preferences (e.g. Madsen 2007; contrast
‘politically powerful’ international courts in Alter, 2014: 281). 
Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe (2008)
My  first  case  precipitated  perhaps  the  most  dramatic  backlash  against  an
international  court  in  recent  history:  southern  African  states  stripping  the  SADC
Tribunal of its individual access rights (Alter, 2014: 58). Their ferocious reaction is only
comprehensible once the significance of  land for collective identity in Zimbabwe and
southern Africa has been understood (contrast Nathan, 2013, stressing sovereignty). 
In 1978 40 per cent of land in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) belonged to white
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farmers. Less than 4 per cent of the population were white. Africans could not own land
privately  (see  Alexander,  2006:  83-104).  In  1980  the  country’s  national  liberation
movements  acceded  to  a  democratic  transition  significantly  below  their  initial
expectations. Zimbabweʼs independence constitution entrenched property rights for 10
years, whilst the decade that followed saw a series of administrative orders gazetting
land defeated in the courts on procedural grounds. These cases were usually funded by a
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) legal defence fund established for the purpose (e.g.
Pilossof, 2012: 33-4). Some ruling-party technocrats then complained that the higher
courts  were  imposing  overly-restrictive  conditions  on  land  redistribution  (e.g.
Alexander, 2006: 181). 
By the late 1990s, however,  ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union -
Patriotic Front, the ruling party) faced economic crisis and a serious electoral threat.
Faced with becoming the first ex-liberation movement in the region to lose power, it
abandoned its  self-presentation  as  a  modernising  regime committed  to  rational-legal
norms. In their place it adopted a (not wholly unsuccessful) anti-colonial legitimation
strategy  commonly  labelled  ʽpatriotic  historyʼ.  This  encouraged  the  forcible
expropriation  of  commercial  farmland  -  no  longer  considered  as  simply  a  national
economic asset -  and justified authority in rural  areas on nationalist  and (in places)
patrimonial  grounds.  Court  rulings  against  these  expropriations  were  ignored,  but
retrospectively rationalised via legislation (Alexander, 2006: 180-198).
Campbell
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It  was  the  most  significant  of  these  legislative  rationalisations  -  the
Constitutional Amendment Act No.17 (2005) - that finally separated the CFU from a
significant constituency of farmers. Return to expropriated farms was now explicitly
forbidden.  And  the  CFU  was  no  longer  willing  to  mount  legal  challenges  in  the
Supreme Court, whose bench had been dramatically overhauled after ruling in farmersʼ
favour (Pilossof, 2012: 54-5). A splinter group led by English-born Ben Freeth began
challenging the expropriation of their farms, and land reform as a whole, internationally.
First  they  exhausted  domestic  remedies.  They  challenged  the  constitutionality  of
Constitutional  Amendment  Act  No.17  in  the  Zimbabwean  courts,  fully  expecting
(correctly)  to  lose  (David  Drury,  interview,  Harare,  4th April  2012;  Ben  Freeth,
interview, Harare, 5th April 2012). By doing so, however, they were able to bring the
case before the soon-to-be-opened SADC Tribunal in Namibia; one of a new generation
of African international courts allowing individual petition (Alter, 2014: 82-84).
The Campbell case in Windhoek centered around three issues: 1) the legality of a
clause in Amendment 17 ousting court jurisdiction, 2) the necessity for farmers to be
compensated at a ʽfairʼ rate, and 3) the question of whether Fast-Track Land Reform
(FTLR) as a whole amounted to racial discrimination. This last point was, of course, a
direct challenge to ʽpatriotic historyʼ, and a dramatic illustration of Hirschlʽs (2008)
ʽjudicialisation  of  mega-politicsʼ.  When  the  case  was  heard  in  July  2008  the
Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) tried, repeatedly,  to delay proceedings. Eventually
Judge President Luis Antonio Mondlane dismissed these attempts, declaring that ʽwe
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are trying to build a  house of justice in this regionʼ; a statement later interpreted as
evidence of the tribunalʼs wish to be to be esteemed by the ʽglobal community of lawʼ
(e.g.  Gauntlett,  2010).  Dramatically,  however,  this  decision  to  adjudicate  the  case
prompted the GOZʼs lawyers to walk out of court. 
This  clear  ʽsignallingʼ  of executive preferences  might  have been expected to
produce a ‘chilling effect’. The tribunal’s mandate, notably, had left the SADC Summit
of member states entirely responsible for enforcement: free to determine if the tribunal
would become a paper tiger.  Nonetheless, to the GOZʼs dismay, the court still rejected
its  assertion  that  FLTR  constituted  a  legitimate  ʽpublic  purposeʼ  in  the  special
circumstances of a post-colonial state, reasoning that: 
ʽwe wish to observe here that if:  (a)  the criteria adopted by the respondent in
relation to the land reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and
objective; (b) fair compensation was paid in respect of the expropriated lands, and
(c)  the  lands  expropriated  were  indeed distributed  to  poor,  landless  and other
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups, rendering the purpose of
the programme legitimate,  the differential  treatment afforded to the Applicants
would not constitute racial discriminationʼ (in Zongwe, 2009: 23).
Contrary to assumptions of deference on weak courts, only on remedies did the tribunal
cater (somewhat) to the executive (see Alter, 2014: 60). The GOZ was merely ʽdirected
to take all necessary measures through its agents to protect the possession, occupation
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and ownership of the lands of the Applicantsʼ.  It  was not required to do the (now)
impossible,  and ʽrestore the rule  of  law in commercial  farming areasʼ,  as  had been
ordered to by the Zimbabwean Supreme Court in 2001 (see Pilossof, 2012: 54).
Backlash
This cautious approach to remedies, however, did not insulate the court from
backlash. Almost immediately the GOZ began arguing that the tribunal was illegally
constituted because the relevant protocol of the SADC Treaty had not been ratified. In
2010 the SADC Summit of Heads of State agreed to temporarily suspend the tribunal
and review its competences. Then, in 2012, after rejecting official recommendations that
the courtʼs powers actually be reinforced, the summit decided that individuals could no
longer access the tribunal. Despite condemnation from such groups as the International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ), and moral  authorities such as Desmond Tutu, numerous
Zimbabwean and SADC political leaders used the occasion to question the tribunalʼs
very right to rule on the land question (Nathan, 2013: 877-9, 884-5).  
Analysis
One of the most striking aspects of Campbell  was the relative ease with which
such (predictable  and indeed predicted)  backlash could  have  been avoided by legal
means. The ruling was hardly dictated by the ʽletter of the lawʼ (compare Alter, 2014:
281).  The  court  simply  granted  itself  jurisdiction  by  pointing  to  a  (rather  vague)
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insistence in the SADCʼs founding treaty that states ʽshall act in accordance with the
principles...[of]  human rights,  democracy,  and the rule  of lawʼ.  As conceded by the
courtʼs international legal assistant, ʽconservative positivists may thus have problems
with  the  approach taken by the  Tribunalʼ  (Musarurwa,  2010:  11).  The  court  could,
indeed,  have  decided  to  rule  only on  compensation  and  the  ouster  of  Zimbabwean
courts.  However,  after  disagreeing until  the  day before  the  judgement,  the  majority
eventually also ruled on racial discrimination (Zongwe, 2009: 22). As counsel Jeremy
Gauntlett (2010) explained, ʽa striking aspect of the SADC main ruling in Campbell
was that it ruled on all three of the attacks - and sustained each. Often courts will not do
that, if one is dispositiveʼ. 
This  majority  opinion  continually,  moreover,  cited  foreign  judicial  decisions.
Courts  seeking  to  boost  their  international  reputation  often  do  this  ʽto  define  their
reference groupʼ, in this case the ʽglobal community of lawʼ (Garoupa and Ginsburg,
2015: 171). And the tribunal justified its ruling on the ouster of the Zimbabwean courts
citing the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACHR), and the highest courts of the United Kingdom and South Africa: an
apparently classic  case of  inter-judicial  ʽdialogueʼ.  More controversially the tribunal
also rejected the GOZʼs claims that land expropriation could not be understood as an
issue of human rights and racial discrimination. The distinctive nature of post-colonial
agrarian reform, the GOZ argued, would always ensure that one racial group must be
indirectly but disproportionately affected. Instead the tribunal accepted the applicantsʼ
invitation to treat racial discrimination as forbidden by jus cogens: a universally binding
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norm of international law (for analysis Zongwe, 2009: 25). 
By taking this approach the tribunal refused to legitimate its decision in the eyes
of regional political audiences. A consolidating political consensus now held that land
must  not  be  regulated  by  dominant  international  norms.  Since  Zimbabweʼs
expropriations,  it  had become increasingly illegitimate  to  frame land as  an  issue  of
ownersʼ (human) rights. Activist groups, led by former South African President Thabo
Mbeki, had managed to successfully persuade legal and political elites that the  land
question had dangerously ʽdisappeared from public viewʼ, its place ʽtaken by the issue
of human rightsʼ. Even such liberal administrations as that in Botswana now endorsed
these nationalist frames (Alden and Anseeuw, 2009: 110-2, 139-143, 169, 178; Nathan,
2013: 885). 
The tribunalʼs approach to this question also contrasted with that preferred by
the  region’s  most  prominent  network  of  human  rights  activists.  (With  Zimbabwe
Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) as its central node, this network also includes the
Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC) and the ICJ.3)   These activists, certainly,
have consistently behaved as ʽshrewd political  animal[s]ʼ.  Being outside Slaughterʼs
ʽglobal  community of  lawʼ,  their  decision-making has  not  been subject  to  the same
pressures as the regional judiciary, even if they share value preferences. This network,
for example, has studiously avoided the increasingly contentious questions of rights and
racial  discrimination  raised  by Amendment  17  of  2005,  challenging  only its  ouster
clause  at  the  United  Nations. They have  also  taken  the  same  issue  to  the  African
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Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), where they have connections,
and ZLHR observer status.  In 2005 ZLHR even had seven cases lodged against the
GOZ before the Commission, at a time when Zimbabwe had more cases against it than
any other country. Under such circumstances framing land as international human rights
would have almost certainly escalated Zimbabweʼs (still low-level) resistance against
the  commission  into  full-blown  backlash.  And,  in  fact,  the  commission  has  long
preferred  to  stress  ʽthe colonial  element  of  the  Zimbabwe situationʼ (Murray,  2011:
188). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, when the Campbell farmers sought to appeal
the Summitʼs restructuring of the tribunal to the African Court of Human Rights in
2013,  the  commission  refused to  pass  the  case  on4.  In  rejecting  this  complaint,  the
commission was acting as the European Commission on Human Rights had in the 1960s
and  1970s,  when  it  built  legitimacy  for  the  ECtHR  by  shielding  it  from  cases
threatening member statesʼ sovereign prerogatives (Madsen,  2007:  144-152).  SALC,
which had sought to  dissuade the  Campbell applicants from litigating,  criticised the
SADC  Tribunal  for  not  taking  such  a  cautious approach  towards  safeguarding  its
institutional  integrity.  In  2013 its  Director  argued that  ʽthe  Tribunal  shouldnʼt  have
handled such high impact and controversial cases from its inception but should rather
have  focused  on  building  legitimacy  in  its  rulings  over  matters  which  werenʼt  as
controversialʼ (SAFPI, 2013; also Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd May 2012).
The five judges that  ruled on  Campbell,  however,  were not  drawn from this
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activist network5. No judges came from states where white populations retained the bulk
of  commercial  farmland  (Namibia,  South  Africa,  and  Zimbabwe).  Only  Onkemetse
Tshosa, a Botswanan judge who dissented on the issue of racial discrimination, had any
prior record of public engagement with these issues.  He was even criticised by one
Zimbabwean  scholar  for  academic  work  ʽunderstat[ing]  the  extent  to  which  post-
independent  Zimbabwe has  engaged  in  practices  which  violate  international  human
rights  lawʼ  (Zimudzi,  2002:  2).  Judge  Rigoberto  Kambovo  from Angola  has  some
experience with inter-judicial networking, but only in the fields of maritime law and
combating transnational crime. Judge Isaac Mtambo, from the Malawian Supreme Court
of Appeal, was educated in Malawi and a former Director of Private Prosecutions who
had  climbed  the  domestic  ranks.  Charles  Mkandiriwe,  the  court  registrar,  and  ICJ
commissioner, has however made it clear that he understood the problems the tribunal
faced  as  analogous  to  those  confronting  regional  courts  elsewhere  -  especially  the
ECtHR and the East  African Court  of Justice (EACJ) -  with whose staff  he was in
regular  ʽdialogueʼ  (Charles  Mkandiriwe,  interview,  Windhoek,  22nd August  2011).
Certainly, under Judge President Mondlane - one of Mozambiqueʼs most senior jurists -
dialogue with international courts became a tribunal priority. A year before Campbell it
arranged visits for judges to the ECtHR, International Court of Justice, European Court
of Justice, International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Hague Conference on Private
International Law; and networking in London with judges from another six international
courts,  including the  Caribbean Court  of  Justice  and two African  regional  tribunals
(Hulse and van der Vleuten, 2015: 92-3).
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In the case of Judge Ariranga Pillay from Mauritius, however, evidence for the
influence  of  the  ʽglobal  community  of  lawʼ  is  somewhat  less  speculative.  Deeply
enmeshed in international human rights networks, Pillay has been a Vice-Chairman of
the UN Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; a drafter of reports for the
UN Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; a fellow in human rights at
the  University  of  London;  and  a  regular  speaker  at  international  human  rights
conferences. He was also, perhaps unsurprisingly, the only judge to dissent on costs,
declaring that the ʽexceptionalʼ nature of the case justified ʽthe award of costs to the
applicants in the interests of justiceʼ. Alone amongst his brethren, he has made public
statements  about  the  case since  the  judgement.  In  a  2011  interview,  for  example  -
delivered between speeches  on the topic to  the Law Society of Namibia and South
African Constitutional Court Alumni Association - Pillay implied that the Tribunal had
anticipated member statesʼ reactions: ʽIt [the Tribunal] gave off all the right buzz words,
you know, ʽdemocracy, rule of law, human rightsʼ … they [member states] got the shock
of their lives when we said these principles are not only aspirational but also justiciable
and enforceableʼ (see Nathan, 2013: 884). In 2013 he even reportedly declared that the
Tribunalʼs ʽdemise was predictable and inevitableʼ: clearly suggesting that executive
signalling  had  been  ignored  (SAFPI,  2013).  Pillay,  finally,  was  dismissive  of  the
growing regional consensus about land and rights, criticising Mauritius for siding with
Zimbabwe when it didnʼt have any of ʽthe same historical hangoversʼ (Christie, 2011). 
Sesana v The Attorney General (2006)
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2006 saw dramatic confrontation between the government of Botswana and its
High Court (then at the apex of the permanent judicial system). On the 13 th December
the Court ruled on the longest and most expensive case in the countryʼs history. This
lawsuit  was  also  the  most  controversial,  with  Survival  International,  a  British
indigenous rights NGO, using it to condemn the human rights record of the government,
hitherto seen internationally as a beacon of liberal democracy in Africa.
Historical context
Sesana centered around the relocation of ‘indigenous’ San populations from the
Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR); a policy pursued as part of a strikingly ill-
informed civilising mission pursued by both colonial and postcolonial administrations.
As early as 1890, indeed, the San, who neither lived in villages not owned cattle, had
been  ‘consigned  to  a  peripheral,  wild,  uncontrolled  nature’ in  the  ideology  of  the
dominant  Tswana  ethnic  group.  This  determination  to  ‘settle’  the  San  was  only
reinforced  under  late  British  colonialism,  and  with  the  spectacular  developmental
success of the post-colonial Tswana elite in the later twentieth-century (Wilmsen 2002,
829). 
The immediate background to the case, however, related to a wave of relocations
of San from the CKGR dating from mid-1997. In the previous year soon-to-be-President
Festus Mogae had referred to CKGR inhabitants as ʽStone Age creature[s]ʼ who ʽmust
19
change, or otherwise, like the dodo, they will perishʼ. The governmentʼs stated objective
was to develop a new settlement for these ʽnomadicʼ populations, equipped with social
services.  Almost  immediately,  however,  controversy  erupted  over  the  adequacy  of
consultation, (promised) compensation paid, and alleged threats about the use of force
(Zips-Mairitsch, 2013: 243, 306-312). 
Between 1997 and mid-2001 a coalition of international and Botswanan NGOs
attempted urgent negotiations with the government, advocating a new Management Plan
for the Reserve. For reasons that are still hotly disputed, however, these negotiations
had  broken  down  by  mid-2001.  In  October  the  government  announced  that  game
licenses would no longer be renewed, and services, including water, would no longer be
provided for those who had returned to the CKGR. In January 2002 (armed) police and
officials  removed water  storage tanks,  closed the last  remaining borehole,  separated
some families, and dismantled (sometimes bulldozing) property, relocating all but a few
households  to  the  new  resettlement  villages.  The  government  blamed  Survival
International (SI) for this change of heart,  reacting to a confrontational SI advocacy
campaign that accused it of seeking ʽconflict diamondsʼ in newly-vacated Reserve lands
(Saugestad, 2011: 41-45).
Sesana
The Sanʼs NGO supporters were now left with no choice but to litigate a dispute
striking at the heart of ʽformative collective identityʼ in Botswana (Hirschl, 2008: 98).
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The widespread initial ʽexpectation [was] that land rights would be introduced into the
case as a more explicit claim for ownership, not only for lawful occupationʼ; a direct
challenge to the governmentʼs oft-repeated view that ʽall Batswana are indigenous to the
countryʼ (Saugestad, 2011: 45). The litigantsʼ final list of demands was, however, more
modest (at least at first glance). They asked the court to rule on four issues; firstly, if
cutting-off  services  to  the  CKGR  was  ‘unlawful  and  constitutional’;  secondly,  if
government had to restore those services; thirdly, if the applicants had been in lawful
possession  of  their  lands  before  2002,  and deprived  of  them without  consent;  and,
fourthly, if it was ‘unlawful and constitutionalʼ to refuse to issue special game licenses
and permits to the enter the CKGR (Sesana v The Attorney General, 2006: judgement of
Dibotelo, paragraph 3)6.
There were a number of striking aspects of how the court handled this case. The
first was that the state, despite being confident of winning within three months, ended
up suffering a humiliating defeat two years later. The High Court found in its favour
only  on  the  constitutionality  of  cutting-off  and  failing  to  restore  services.  Just  as
strikingly,  however,  every  issue  was  decided  upon  differently  by  the  three  judgesʼ
separate opinions. As in  Campbell, that is, the judges were presented with a range of
legally acceptable options.  Easily the most  dramatic  of  their  conclusions was Judge
Dowʼs finding that, for the first time in the countryʼs history, the government should be
ordered  to  treat  different  ethnic  groups  differently.  Finding  that  the  (locally
controversial)  international  law  concept  of  ʽindigenous  peoplesʼ  was  relevant  to
Botswana, she found that the ʽBasarwa [San]ʼ:
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ʽbelong to an ethnic group that is not socially and politically organised in the same
manner  as  the  majority  of  other  Tswana-speaking  ethnic  groups  and  the
importance of this is that programmes and projects that have worked with other
groups in the country will not necessarily work when simply cut and pasted to the
Applicantsʼ situationʼ (Sesana v The Attorney General, 2006: judgement of Dow,
paragraph 186).
These findings were accompanied by forthright criticisms of the executive:
ʽthis is a case that questions the meaning of ʽdevelopmentʼ and demands of the
respondent  to  take  a  closer  look  at  its  definition  of  that  notion.  One  of
colonialismʼs greatest failings was to assume that development was, in the case of
Britain, Anglicising, the colonised [...] Botswana has a unique opportunity to do
things  differentlyʼ  (Sesana  v  The  Attorney  General,  2006:  judgement  of  Dow,
paragraph 272).
Backlash
In the decade since the case,  however,  there has been very little indeed that
could be  characterised as  compliance.  At  most,  the  government  has  responded with
ʽrestrictive interpretation[s]ʼ and ʽconsiderable ... foot-draggingʼ (Saugestad, 2011: 50).
It announced that only named applicants could return to the CKGR without permits, and
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even they would need identity documents. Domestic animals and permanent structures
were banned. Water from outside would only be allowed if transported at the applicantsʼ
expense. And applications for game licenses would need individual assessment. As of
March 2012 none had been granted (Zips-Mairitsch, 2013: 354-6). All these instances of
ʽdeliberately failing to  abide by court  rulingsʼ  were,  moreover,  accompanied by the
ʽbypassing [of] judicial institutions as channels of adjudicationʼ: another practice that
Vondoepp and Ellett (2011: 152) classify as an ʽinstitutional assaultʼ on the judiciary.
Under new President Ian Khama (from 2008) the government declared its openness to
ʽdialogueʼ with the  Sesana  applicants, but only on condition that ʽoutsidersʼ were not
involved - a process failing to yield any significant results (Saugestad, 2011: 51-2; Zips-
Mairitsch,  2013:  357-8).   Dramatically,  moreover,  given  the  value  it  attaches  to  its
international  image,  the  government  has  been  criticised  for  non-implementation  of
Sesana  and  its  successor  lawsuits  by the  UN Special  Rapporteur  on  the  Rights  of
Indigenous Peoples (in 2007 and 2010), the UN Special  Rapporteur on the Right to
Food (in 2007), the UN Human Rights Committee (in 2008), the UN Committee on the
Elimination of Racial  Discrimination (in 2010), the United States (in 2013),  and, in
2014,  the UN Special  Rapporteur  on Cultural  Rights  (Survival  International,  2016).
Unsurprisingly, however, given the government’s well-known sensitivity to criticism on
this score, this condemnation has proved largely counter-productive (Saugestad, 2011).  
There has also been some speculation in Botswana that backlash against Sesana
has  also  been  (at  least  partially)  responsible  for  ʽpersonnel  manipulationʼ  and  the
ʽpacking [of the] court with supporters while purging it of opponentsʼ (VonDoepp and
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Ellett, 2011: 152-3). Opposition politicians certainly cited  Sesana when questioning if
Unity Dow had really retired from the court in 2008, or whether she had been ʽpushedʼ.
2010,  similarly,  saw the  elevation  to  Chief  Justice  of  Maruping  Dibotelo,  the  only
Sesana  judge who had found for  the  government  on  all  counts,  and who had also
presided over the initial case which the applicants were appealing against (a procedural
irregularity)7. Less speculatively, non-compliance with CKGR rulings has been one of
the  foremost  charges  that  the  organised  legal  profession  has  levelled  against  the
government  over  the  last  six  years;  a  period  which  has  seen  the  Law  Society  of
Botswana agitate  for constitutional  reform and transparent  judicial  appointments,  all
against a background of increasingly authoritarian rule (see Good, 2010).
Analysis
This new Botswanan debate over constitutionalism was already reflected in the
three separate Sesana opinions. Not only did the judges reach different conclusions, but
they  appealed  to  very  different  legal  constituencies.  Justice  Dibotelo,  perhaps
unsurprisingly, made reference almost exclusively to Botswanan positive law. Justice
Mpaphi Phumaphi, meanwhile, did censure the executive (albeit more cautiously than
Justice Dow), basing his reasoning on decisions made by other Commonwealth courts.
His decisive ruling on the issue of services, for example, was grounded in the doctrine
of legitimate expectations. This doctrine was invented by the famously liberal British
jurist Lord Denning in 1969, intended to curtail the discretionary power of bureaucracy.
And  its  relevance  mobilised  longstanding  common  law  networks  around  Sesana.
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Christopher  Forsyth,  notably,  a  leading  authority  on  administrative  law  in
Commonwealth  jurisdictions,  delivered  a  lecture  at  the  University  of  Botswana just
months  before  the  judgement  in  Sesana  was  due.  Concerned  by  ʽactivistʼ trends
elsewhere, he devoted his lecture to ʽSome Pitfalls for Botswana to Avoidʼ. It warned
against expanding the doctrine of legitimate expectations into an ʽinchoate substitute for
fairnessʼ (Forsyth,  2006:  5).  Phumaphi  then  referenced  Forsyth  in  Sesana to  make
exactly this argument, re-affirming more established common-law precedent (Sesana v
The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Phumaphi, paragraphs 55-6). 
On  the  question  of  lawful  occupation,  by  contrast,  Phumaphi  found  in  the
applicantsʼ favour. He did this, once again, by referring to common law jurisprudence,
citing the Australian High Courtʼs most famous judgement:  Mabo and Others v The
State of Queensland (1992). This ruling had held that ʽaboriginal titleʼ had not been
extinguished when the British Crown claimed possession of relevant lands. It found that
the infamous doctrine of  terra nullius (no-oneʼs land), which the British had used to
justify  their  claims,  no  longer  accorded,  in  Justice  Brennanʼs  words,  with  ʽthe
expectations  of  the  international  communityʼ and  the  ʽcontemporary  values  of  the
Australian peopleʼ. Like Sesana in Botswana, Mabo signalled (some) Australian judgesʼ
desire  to  reconcile  common-law  jurisprudence  with  the  new  rights-based  brand  of
constitutional  interpretation  characteristic  of  the  ʽglobal  community  of  lawʼ (for
analysis Ngʼongʼola, 2007). 
In contrast to Justice Phumaphi, but like Judge Pillay in Campbell, Unity Dow
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justified her decisions on the basis of international human rights - looking far beyond
the bounds of the common-law world. She justified this ʽactivistʼ approach by citing
U.S. Supreme Court doctrines of ʽgenerous constructionʼ previously referenced in Dow
v the Attorney General (1991). This earlier case had been the best-known in Botswanaʼs
legal history, and had featured Dow herself as litigant. Demanding citizenship rights for
her children (her husband was from the United States), Dow publicly described this
action as a ʽtest caseʼ with broad implications for ʽimplementing changeʼ for African
women.  It  was  also the  first  civil  action  in  Botswana to  allege  that  parliament  had
violated human rights and exceeded its constitutional powers (Pfotenhauer and Dow,
1991).  Now,  in  Sesana,  Dow  made  the  similarly  path-breaking  finding  that  ʽthe
Applicants  belong  to  a  class  of  peoples  that  have  now  come  to  be  recognized  as
ʽindigenous peoplesʼʼ; an opinion justified solely by reference to a leading UN expert.
On the issue of service restoration, moreover, Dow interpreted the doctrine of legitimate
expectations  in  precisely the  ʽactivistʼ manner  that  Christopher  Forsyth  had warned
against (for a common-lawyerʼs critique Ngʼongʼola, 2007: 109-11).
Like  Judge  Pillay,  Dow had  long  been  a  part  of  international  human  rights
networks. In fact she was esteemed as something of a judical superstar  (see Ginsburg
and Garoupa 2015, 39). In the 1980s, after legal training in Edinburgh, she had been
responsible for creating many of Botswanaʼs first organisations dedicated to womenʼs
rights (Bauer and Ellett, 2015: 43). This helped attract support from Swedish donors and
international  NGOs for  her  1991 ʽtest  caseʼ.  Then,  in  her  subsequent  career  on the
bench, as summarised by one  Sesana lawyer, she became a judge ʽwilling to listen to
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arguments that to some conservative judges would seem to be outrageous. In the CKGR
case, I think she brought it home in the plainest mannerʼ (in Segwai, 2008). Sesana did
indeed help signal Dowʼs membership of the ʽglobal community of lawʼ. After retiring
in 2008 she received the Legion dʼHonneur and was invited to teach indigenous rights at
Columbia Law School. By far the most dramatic evidence for Dowʼs attentiveness to
global rights audiences comes, however, from her 2006 novel  The Heavens May Fall.
Written, rather astonishingly, while she was adjudicating Sesana, the book concludes by
attacking Botswanaʼs denial of rights to indigenous peoples; sees its main character (a
young female human rights lawyer) confront the Chief Justice, alleging bias on the High
Court;  has  her  deliver  a  speech  at  the  Law  Societyʼs  Annual  Dinner  criticising
Botswanaʼs  reputation  as  ʽa  shining  example  of  democracy  in  Africaʼ;  and  covers
numerous  other  themes  from  the  global  human  rights  script,  including  Darfur,
HIV/AIDS, sexual consent, and violence against women. 
Whilst  Sesana (albeit  to  a  lesser  extent  than  Campbell)  may have  deepened
threats  to  the  institutional  integrity  of  the Botswanan  judiciary,  it  hardly  damaged
Dowʼs own relations with the executive. Returning to Botswana, Dow actually joined
the ruling Botswanan Democratic Party (BDP) in 2012, amid some controversy. The
political opposition speculated that the BDP had been in contact with Dow whilst she
was still on the bench - reacting, they implied, to her famously independent judgements.
The  government,  more  certainly,  has  sought  to  use  Dowʼs  global  cultural  capital,
enhanced by Sesana, to re-legitimise its rule. Under President Khama she has been the
only  politician to benefit from laws allowing women to be appointed to parliament as
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Specially Elected Members (Bauer and Ellett, 2015: 43). Her recent trajectory, in short,
neatly illustrates how judges can be inserted in domestic and global networks that not
only co-exist but interact (Dezalay, 2015: 19-20). And it confirms how ʽa mix of ideas
and  benefits  shapes  most  judicial  networksʼ,  notably  ʽwhen  benefits  include  career
advancement or public esteemʼ (see special issue introduction ).
Conclusion
My goal in this article has been to re-invigorate the debate surrounding Anne-
Marie  Slaughter's  ʽglobal  community  of  lawʼ.  I  have  argued  that  this  inter-judicial
network may be of most influence in high-profile human rights lawsuits adjudicated by
courts seeking the esteem of their foreign and international counterparts. This claim has
been made by probing the plausibility of a central assumption in strategic models of
judicial decision-making: that judges seek to protect the institutional integrity of their
courts. In both my case studies executive signalling towards the court in fact actually
failed to exercise a ʽchilling effectʼ on judgesʼ decision-making. Yet backlash was both
predictable  and  easily  avoidable  through  legal  means.  Individual  judgesʼ decisions
certainly  varied  in  both  cases.  They  ranged  from  wholesale  agreement  with  the
governmentʼs position (Justice Dibotelo), to wholesale rejection of government visions
for  ʽformative  collective  identityʼ (Judge  Pillay and  Justice  Dow).  I  have  provided
interpretive evidence indicating how a desire for esteem from global judicial networks
could  function  as  an  independent  variable  here,  helping  explain  this  variation.
Communicating through personal contacts in judicial networks, and via the citation of
foreign  court  decisions,  Southern  African  judges  have  made  (ultimately  dangerous)
28
claims to membership of an international human rights guild. 
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